# Advantage One: Terrorism

#### CIA supervision of drone strikes make it at an all-time high

The Canberra Times 6/19

(The Canberra Times, “New way to fight terrorism,” 6/19/13, EGM, 8/5/13)

New way to fight terrorism B ritish Prime Minister David Cameron said before the G8 meeting at Enniskillen that extremist and terrorist violence would be at the top of this year's G8 summit agenda. **While the G8 can all agree that the changing face of terrorism is a major concern, there is little acknowledgement that the terrorism** directed at the G8 **partners is mainly an outcome of their own internal or foreign policies**. In 1975, when it had its first meeting, the G6 comprised the six wealthiest nations. Canada and Russia later joined to make it the G8. The G8 today are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and the US. The EU has two observers. The group does not include China, probably now the world's wealthiest nation. Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa have been guests at some G8 meetings and are sometimes referred to as the Outreach Five or O5. Of the O5, only two have serious terrorism concerns - India from its left-wing Naxalites and Pakistan-sponsored Muslim terrorism, and Mexico from crime- motivated narco-terrorism. **A particular new G8 concern is the spread of terrorism in north and west Africa**, which has implications for all the G8 members. **North African extremists are now well armed, thanks to the ill- advised Western intervention** in Libya against Gaddafi that allowed extremists to loot his armouries of advanced weapon systems, including surface-to-air missiles. The West is repeating the mistake, in Syria, of backing a fractured (and not widely popular) opposition that is likely to create major regional problems if it ever succeeds in displacing the well- entrenched, conservative and predictable Assad regime. **Ironically, while the main focus of the G8 is on its economic problems, terrorism has probably never been better funded than it is today**, with money flowing in from narcotics protection, kidnap for ransom, wealthy sponsors, zakat payments and charity fronts. **Meanwhile, home-grown extremists in the West can simply take out a bank loan to fund their activities**. **If the aim of Western policy over the past 10 years had been to stoke up the terrorism threat, it seems to have succeeded admirably.** US involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved disastrous in creating new terrorism problems. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a more dangerous problem today than it was when it opposed the US occupation, and it is very active in Syria as well. Some Australian politicians cite the number of girls receiving schooling in Oruzgan as evidence of our counterterrorism success in Afghanistan, but the schooling situation for girls will change for the worse in Oruzgan after 2014, as it will elsewhere in the south and east of Afghanistan under Taliban influence. **Meanwhile, CIA drone strikes,** while effective at taking out terrorist leaders, **have made the US a whole new generation of enemies in Pakistan and Yemen. Drone strikes are also thought to be leading to revenge attacks**, like the one on the US consulate in Benghazi, which was probably payback for the drone-killing of Libyan al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi in Pakistan. **The US does not want to acknowledge that CIA drone strikes are putting its diplomats at risk**, but it must be a concern for the State Department. In many Western countries the infection of mismanaged disputes, such as those in Palestine, Chechnya and Syria, is blowing back in the form of young, first-generation Muslim immigrants becoming radicalised by them - or getting involved in overseas conflicts, to return home with dangerous new skill sets. There may be more than 100 Australians fighting in foreign conflicts, mainly in Syria, but also supporting what are essentially nationalist causes in the Caucasus and Kurdish northern Iraq. **Radicalisation in Western countries is also occurring on an unprecedented scale through the internet**, particularly through the extremist magazine Inspire, and Facebook. Despite all the hype about the US PRISM electronic surveillance program, and its many successes, **the scale of the radicalisation problem is beyond the capacity of intelligence agencies to prevent all terrorism incidents**. Recent examples of successful small group attacks include the Boston marathon bombing and the callous butchering of Drummer Lee Rigby in London. Australia has been fortunate so far, but our intelligence community knows we have little to be complacent about. What seems obvious is that Australia needs to cut itself loose from slavishly following US policy leads and work out what counterterrorism policies make most sense for us. We have clearly been disadvantaged by following problem- causing US involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Having a more even-handed approach to the Israel/Palestine issue is another obvious example - it also makes sense politically now that we seem to have more Muslims in Australia than supporters of Israel. The Palestinian cause is one of the basic rallying cries for young Muslims to engage in jihad against the West. Obviously we do not want to adopt policies just because they might stop terrorists trying to kill us - but rather because they make sense for Australia. We could, for example, make a difference by being more proactive in helping resolve disputes that, while they do not engage our direct interests, facilitate and feed terrorism - such as the Kashmir dispute or the Christian/Muslim divide in the southern Philippines. The G20 summit, which Australia will host in Brisbane in November 2014, could provide an opportunity for us to explore with a broader group of partners what alternative counterterrorism initiatives and policies might be adopted. We should break out of the cycle of the past 10 years of adopting, mainly for political and strategic reasons, counterterrorism approaches that have subsequently proved detrimental to our national security interests. 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**Drones destroy confidence in the Pakistani government—causes people to run to terrorist organizations**

Awan, 6/2

(Imran Awan, The Guardian UK, “US drone attacks are further radicalising Pakistan,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/02/us-drone-strikes-pakistan-terrorists>, 6/24/13, EGM)

The US airstrike last week, which killed the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) second in command Wali ur Rehman has again raised the contentious issue about the legality of US drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States, like many of its allies across the international community were quick to hail this operation a success. Yet underneath this bravado lays a very serious question and that is" despite killing high profile figures such as Wali ur Rehman and Baitullah Mehsud in 2009, **the methods used to target the Taliban may** in actual fact **be** acting as a **recruitment** tool **for extremist organisations in Pakistan** who have an apathy towards the Taliban. **The latest airstrike came** as the dust was settling from the recent Pakistani elections. At a crucial time **when the TPP were willing to hold "peace talks" with the new Pakistani** Nawaz Sharif **administration,** **this** US airstrike **seems to again have reignited anti-US/Pak relations**. The drone strikes are mainly used in the federally administered tribal areas, and whilst accurate statistics about the number of drone strikes and casualties are difficult to ascertain because of the nature of access, the Bureau of Investigative Journalists has argued that at least 2,541 to 3,540 people have been killed in drone attacks and almost 411 to 884 of those are civilians. When Imran Khan, the cricketer turned politician and leader of the Pakistani Tehreek-e-Insaf party famously said he would shoot down a drone if elected as Pakistan's next prime minister, many commentators viewed it as light satire appealing to the middle class vote. Yet his statement does appear to represent the majority of Pakistani's views on drone attacks. A 2011 Pew poll of drone attacks, for example, showed that **89% of Pakistani citizens argue that drones kill innocent people.** Moreover, a report published by Stanford and New York Universities in 2011 showed the scale of the psychological impact drone attacks had on Pakistani civilians who felt "terrorised" by them. **The most damning piece of evidence against** the use of **drone strikes** was in March 2011 **when 40 people were killed, many** of whom were **civilians** at a local tribal meeting. Thus, **public perception of drones in Pakistan** is one that **portrays** a **lack of trust and confidence in the Pakistani government** for its pro-drone stance which has inevitably left a vacuum for extremist groups like the TPP and others that gives them an opportunity to amplify their actions and raise the public alarm through a number of well-coordinated and sophisticated terrorist assaults upon the public. **The use of drone strikes** also **allows the Taliban to win the "hearts and minds"** game **and** as a result it **has been successful at recruiting disaffected Pakistanis** from within the villages and streets using emotive and effective propaganda tools such as CDs and DVDs, which are used in local Madrassahs across the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where they can effectively operate with a free reign. Much of the literature uses motivational powerful themes which would appeal to the youth and at the same time allow the Taliban to recruit future generations by adopting a strong anti-US narrative and using religion and theology to justify their actions. Indeed, this is true in the rise of "lone wolf" terrorists such as the Pakistani-born US citizen Faisal **Shahzad**, **who attempted to detonate a bomb in Time Square**. In his trial Shahzad **cited the drone strikes in Pakistan as one of the reasons for his grievance against US** policy makers. Interestingly, Obama has done everything possible to distance himself from the George W Bush administration policies on the "war on terror", yet he continues to support the drone strikes, a policy brought in by the former president. Obama and his Vice-President Joe Biden have recently been attempting to justify the use of drones through a blaze of interviews via social networking sites. In a recent video session on Google+, President Obama justified the use of drones as the only means to avoid "intrusive military action". **The use of drones violates Pakistan's sovereignty** and whilst the death of Wali ur Rehman will be celebrated across the United States and afar, for ordinary Pakistanis there is a chilling reminder that reprisal attacks are around the corner. US drones put all Pakistani's at risk and therefore are counter-productive in defeating the Taliban. Their legality can also be questioned and ultimately their psychological impact on Pakistanis and inhumane manner in which they have killed many innocent civilians is fermenting and radicalizing more people and creating a destabilised Pakistani society. Within this heightened atmosphere, **a hydra global insurgency** from a plethora of extremist groups in Pakistan **has emerged** that have links to al-Qaida led extremism **and are willing to die to avenge the death of their leaders.**

#### Lack of transparency causes attacks

**CNN, 12**

(Wire Staff, Cable News Network. “Drone strikes kill, maim and traumatize too many civilians, U.S. study says.” Date made September 25, 2012. Date retrieved August 14, 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/25/world/asia/pakistan-us-drone-strikes>)

The report concedes that "real threats to U.S. security and to Pakistani civilians exist in the Pakistani border areas now targeted by drones." And it acknowledges that drone strikes have "killed alleged combatants and disrupted armed actor networks. But it concludes that drone strikes, which are conducted by the CIA in a country not at war with the United States, are too harmful to civilians, too sloppy, legally questionable and do more harm to U.S. interests than good. "A significant rethinking of current U.S. targeted killing and drone strike policies is long overdue," it says. "U.S. policy-makers, and the American public, cannot continue to ignore evidence of the civilian harm and counter-productive impacts of U.S. targeted killings and drone strikes in Pakistan." The study recommends that Washington undertake measures to rectify collateral damage -- including making public detailed legal justification for strikes, implementing mechanisms transparently to account for civilian casualties, ensuring independent investigations into drone strike deaths, prosecuting cases of civilian casualties and compensating civilians harmed by U.S. strikes in Pakistan. Nine months of research went into the report, according to its authors, which included "two investigations in Pakistan, more than 130 interviews with victims, witnesses, and experts, and review of thousands of pages of documentation and media reporting."

**It’s incredibly likely—9/11 changed the game—causes extinction**

Bellany, 12

(Ian, Late Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, also former Director of the Centre for the Study of Arms Control and International Security and on the CTBT Commission, “Outflanking missile defences: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons, and terrorism” Defense & Security Analysis 28:1, March 2012 , 81-96, accessed 6-21-12 //Bosley)

**Prior to the attacks on** the USA on **11 September** 2001, **it was assumed that terrorists were not interested in causing large-scale casualties.** The Aum excepted, terrorists wanted people watching, but not a lot killed, so went the aphorism. Terrorists were more interested in gaining support for their cause by attracting publicity. **The danger of large-scale carnage would forfeit support for their objectives**. To paraphrase Clausewitz, violence is an extension of politics, not a substitute for it. 9/11 brought a sea change in that it gave a practical demonstration of the 1998 fatwa wherein Al Qaeda decreed that it should be directed specifically at US civilians. **The adverse effects of unfavourable publicity were swamped by the sheer daring of the enterprise.** Daring and skill became the catchwords**, with moderation a sign of weakness**. Since then, **moderation has taken a back seat and maximising casualties became the goal. Extremism replaced restraint.** The consequence was to remove the invisible line between moderate and extreme violence. While moderation ruled, there was an upper limit to destructiveness; on crossing that line, **violence became permissible and included WMD.** WMD refers to weapons that most states have either abandoned or on which they have placed severe international restrictions because of the deadly and morally dubious nature of their high levels of destructiveness. They are of most use against concentrations of population and of limited use on the battlefield. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons fall within this category. **They make ideal modern terrorist weapons**, but are technically difficult for non-specialists to manufacture and to avoid detection. The Aum group failed to make biological weapons in useful quantities; chemical weapons were easier but difficult to disseminate and nuclear weapons were beyond it entirely. By crossing the line between moderation and extreme violence, **terrorist groups** retain one valuable capability: they **are much less easily deterred and have few inhibitions. One nuclear warhead in terrorists’ hands will do the work of 1000 in the hands of states. A nuclear-armed terrorist group** is strong because **it cannot be resisted by classical means.** **This freedom** to use nuclear weapons **is likely to have a magnetic pull on future terrorist thinking**. It seems probable that biological and chemical weapons will have lost ground in terrorist thinking in favour of the more destructive nuclear weapon. There are three forms of terrorist nuclear attack. The first is the so-called “dirty” or radiological bomb. This is a conventional explosive device inside a blanket of radioactive materials. The effects of a dirty bomb are largely psychological, but can also cause physical damage as radioactive-contaminated air is breathed in. **A “dirty-bomb” attack is the easiest to carry out**. The explosive device itself is simple to make and will be fitted with a timer. The radioactive contaminant will have been stolen from a medical source or a nuclear reactor. A medical source – Caesium 137 – is technically the easier of the two because it is often found in containers and safe to handle. An alternative source is nuclear waste from a reactor, kept in storage until ready for reprocessing. Considerable quantities are kept in storage and are subject to international inspection. **Medical sources are subject to less security; only a few containers of medical caesium are required to create a worthwhile bomb.**

#### Specifically, drone strikes in Yemen cause blowback that destabilize the government

Hudson et al, 13

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Just as likely, as the case of FATA has clearly shown**, increased strikes in Yemen will produce distinct forms of blowback.** **This will manifest itself in terms of increased recruitment for al-Qaeda** or affiliated groups **and a reduction of the Yemeni leadership's ability to govern**, increasing competition from alternative groups.¶ In the case of drone use in FATA, **we identified five distinct forms of blowback, all of which are directly applicable to the use of drones in Yemen.** The first, **purposeful retaliation is typified by the events of the** 2009 Khost bombing of **CIA Camp Chapman** **and**, more recently, **an al-Qaeda attack** earlier in 2012 **on a liquid-natural-gas pipeline** running through Yemen's Shabwa province.2 **The motivation behind both of these attacks has been cited as** the unremitting presence of, and specific attacks from, **U.S.-operated drones**. The second form of blowback deals with **the increased ability of AQAP to recruit new members, especially those who have had friends or family killed in the attacks.** Third, **an overreliance on drones creates strategic confusion**. While the United States is not waging a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign next to Yemen — as it is in Afghanistan, Pakistan's western neighbor — **the control of the drone program has oscillated between the CIA and JSOC, reducing U.S. accountability and blurring the lines between military and intelligence operations**. Taken together, **these three factors foster two additional forms of blowback: the continued destabilization of Yemen and an increasingly precarious alliance between the American and Yemeni governments.** All told, these distinct forms of blowback combine to heighten Yemen's ungovernability.

#### Yemeni instability causes oil shocks

Anam, 11

(Fares writer for yobserver.com Instability in Yemen effects oil prices Apr 9, http://www.yobserver.com/local-news/10021048.html)

Foreign concerns that the current political situation in Yemen will affect the prices of oil have emerged. According Money Morning website, oil prices soared to its highest peak within the last two-and-a-half years on Monday because of investor supply concerns. Yemen produces about 300,000 barrels of oil per day, of which about 95% is exported. Money Morning columnist Jon D. Markman, said that because the country sits at the crossroad of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Yemen is strategically positioned. On a daily basis, about three million barrels of Saudi Arabian crude floats past it, mostly destined for the U.S. “That means that Yemen is positioned at a major ‘choke point’ for the regional distribution of oil. And it’s also shaping up as the next big catalyst for rising oil prices,” he said. Occidental Petroleum Corp., DNO International ASA of Norway and OMV AG of Austria have all announced they are evacuating personnel from Yemen. “In Yemen, as elsewhere in the Middle East, expatriates are largely responsible for running the oilfields. And when those expats hit the road, oil production tends to go straight down,” said Markman.

#### That decimates the economy

Li, 12

(Mingqi, associate professor of economics at the University of Utah, "Has the Global Economy Become Less Vulnerable to Oil Price Shocks?", March 14, [www.theoildrum.com/node/9008](http://www.theoildrum.com/node/9008) NL)

Rasmussen and Roitman conducted the study using a cross-national approach, which gave some of the tiny economies the same weight as continent-sized economies such as the United States. Unlike Rasmussen and Roitman, this paper evaluates the impact of oil prices on economic growth for the global economy as a whole.¶ The next section provides some basic observations considering the relationships between world economic growth, oil prices, and oil consumption. This is followed by a more formal time-series regression analysis which finds that oil price rises have significant negative impacts on world economic growth.¶ The Big Picture: Some Observations¶ It is well known that world economic growth depends on the constant expansion of energy supply, and oil accounts for about 40% of the world energy consumption and almost all of the transportation fuels. Thus, the global economy depends on oil for normal functioning in the purely physical sense.¶ However, it is commonly argued that over the years, the oil intensity of the global economy has dramatically declined and as a result, the global economy has become less vulnerable to oil shocks.¶ It is true that measured by oil consumption per dollar of world GDP, world average oil intensity has declined from 0.116 kilogram per dollar in 1980 to 0.060 kilogram per dollar in 2010 (measured in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars), or oil intensity has fallen by about half over three decades.¶ However, this observation by itself does not tell us if the world economic growth has become less dependent on oil consumption growth. Consider two cars: suppose car A is twice as energy efficient as car B. With access to fuel, car A can drive twice as long as car B with the same amount of fuel. But if additional fuel supply is zero, then neither of the two cars can operate any more.¶ Figure 1 shows the historical relationship between world economic growth rates and the annual changes in oil consumption from 1971 to 2011.¶ A simple bivariate regression produces the following result:¶ Change in Oil Consumption = -1.32 + 0.68 \* Economic Growth Rate¶ The above result says that the world economy can grow at approximately 2% a year without requiring any increase in oil consumption. This might be called the “breakeven” world economic growth rate for oil consumption purpose. However, beyond 2%, an increase in world economic growth rate by one percentage point needs to be associated with an increase in oil consumption by near 700,000 barrels a day.¶ For example, if the world economy grows at 3.5% a year, the above equation implies that the world daily oil consumption needs to increase by 1.06 million barrels a year.¶ With the exception of 1980 and 1981, all other observations stay very close to the trend line, suggesting that the observed relationship is robust. Regression R-square is 0.510, or rather, world economic growth alone can explain 51% of the observed variations in oil consumption.¶ A regression that only uses the data from 2001 to 2011 finds that:¶ Change in Oil Consumption = -0.85 + 0.53 \* Economic Growth Rate¶ The slope on the economic growth rate is now somewhat smaller. But note that the “breakeven” economic growth rate now falls to about 1.6%. Evaluated at 3.5% economic growth rate, the associated annual increase in oil consumption is 1.01 million barrels a day. Thus, as far as the relationship between world economic growth and oil consumption growth is concerned, there is little evidence suggesting that world economic growth has become less dependent on oil in recent years.¶ The above simple analysis suggests that any economic growth rate above 2% a year (an economic growth rate that would be required to lower unemployment rates in most countries in the world) would require positive growth in oil consumption.¶ However, a growing body of literature now suggests that world oil production may peak in the near future. It remains unclear when exactly world oil production peak will happen. What has become clear is that world oil supply has become much less responsive to world oil price increases.¶ Figure 2 shows the historical relationship between world oil supply and real oil prices (oil prices in constant 2010 dollars, that is, oil prices corrected for inflation).¶ From January 1994 to May 2004, on average, it took only an increase in oil price by 0.97 dollar to bring about one million barrels of additional daily oil supply. From June 2004 to November 2011, in average, it took an increase in oil price by 11.8 dollars to bring about an increase in daily oil supply by one million barrels. Thus, the observed “world oil supply curve” had become dramatically steepened by almost 12 times. The dramatic steepening of the world oil supply curve has important implications for the prospect of world economic growth.¶ Figure 3 compares the historical world economic growth rates with the share of world oil spending in world GDP.¶ Historically, 4% of world GDP appeared to be a dangerous threshold. Whenever the world oil spending rose above 4% of world GDP for a sustained period of time, global economy had suffered from major instabilities.¶ From 1974 to 1985, the world oil spending stayed above 4% of world GDP for about a decade. During the decade, the global economy suffered three deep recessions: 1974-75, 1980, and 1982 (when world economic growth rate falls below 2%, it is commonly considered to be a deep global economic recession).¶ World oil spending entered into this dangerous territory again in 2006 and 2007 and hit 5% of world GDP in 2008. In 2009, global economy contracted in absolute term for the first time after the Second World War. Based on preliminary estimate, world oil spending again rose above 5% of world GDP in 2011.¶ If one assumes that the world economy will grow at 3.5% a year from 2012 to 2020 and world daily oil consumption will grow by one million barrels a year. Given the observed world oil supply curve, suppose the oil price rises by 10 dollars a year. Then, by the end of the decade, world oil price will rise to 200 dollars a barrel and world oil spending will rise to 7.7% of world GDP.¶ Given the historical evidence, it is almost certain that the global economy will not be able to survive such a dramatic increase in oil spending burden without suffering from some major recessions.¶ Thus, unless the world oil supply curve becomes flattened in the coming years, the world oil supply does not seem to be able to sustain a global economy expanding at a rate of 3.5% a year or above.¶ Oil Price and Economic Growth: A Time-Series Analysis¶ In this section, I conduct a simple time-series analysis to evaluate the impact of oil price changes on world economic growth. All data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, except the real oil prices (in constant 2010 dollars) which are from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy.¶ To have a more accurate examination of the impact of oil price on economic growth, it is necessary to take into account other factors that are likely to have impact on economic growth, so that one does not mistakenly interpret the contributions from other factors as impacts resulting from oil price changes.¶ In the economic theory, it is usually believed that economic growth results from contributions of labor force, human capital, physical capital, and “total factor productivity” (a residual term that may reflect technological progress and institutional change).¶ In this study, in addition to real oil price, the explanatory variables include gross capital formation as percent of GDP (as a proxy of physical capital contribution); annual growth rate of labor force, life expectancy at birth (as a proxy of health conditions of the population); age dependency ratio (old and young dependent population as percent of working-age population, as a measure of the burden on working-age population); education expenditures as percent of gross national income (as a proxy for human capital contribution), trade in goods and services as percent of GDP (as a measure of “globalization” which may have impact on economic institutions and the pace of technological progress); broad money supply as percent of GDP (as a measure of financial integration and possible impacts of macroeconomic policies); and alternative energy as percent of total energy use (as a measure of substitution of renewable and nuclear energies for fossil fuels).¶ The dependent variable (that is, the variable to be explained) is the annual growth rate of world real GDP.¶ To control for the problem of auto-correlation (a common technical problem in time series analysis), all variables have been first differenced, that is, using the variables in the current period less the variables in the previous period. The real oil prices are also first differenced and lagged by one year.¶ Table 1 summarizes the results of alternative regression analyses.¶ In the first regression, all possible explanatory variables are included. However, only gross capital formation is “statistically significant” (that is, the standard error is sufficiently small so that the estimated coefficient has a more than 90% statistical chance to be different zero). The estimate coefficient for real oil price has the right sign. It says that an increase of real oil price by one dollar would lower the world economic growth rate by 0.037% in the following year. However, the estimated coefficient for real oil price is not statistically significant (there is “only” 82% chance for the estimated coefficient to be statistically different from zero).¶ Note that the intercept is very small. In fact, the standard error for the intercept is so large that there is 96% chance for the intercept to be not different zero. Thus, in the remaining regressions, zero intercept is imposed. As the dependent variable (real GDP growth rate) has been first differenced, this effectively assumes that there is no long-term trend for real GDP growth rate to either accelerate or decelerate other than because of changes in the explanatory variables.¶ In the second regression, most explanatory variables remain statistically insignificant. For example, there is 96%, 92%, 87%, 71%, and 64% chance for broad money supply, labor force, alternative energy, trade, and life expectancy respectively to be statistically not different from zero. This suggests that these variables most likely have little impact on economic growth and the inclusion of these variables in regression would only generate “noise” that would make the estimated coefficients for other variables less accurate.¶ In the third regression, the statistically least significant variables are excluded. The estimated coefficient for real oil price now rises to 0.042 and becomes statistically significant.¶ The fourth regression only includes the two statistically significant explanatory variables: gross capital formation and real oil price. The first four regressions use all data from 1971 to 2010 (the data set after first differencing is from 1972 to 2010). The fifth regression uses data from 1991 to 2010 and the sixth uses data from 2001 to 2010.¶ According to the fifth and sixth regression, an increase in real oil price by one dollar would cause world economic growth rate to fall by 0.09 and 0.096% in the following year and the estimated coefficients are statistically highly significant. These results contradict the belief that in recent years the global economy has become less vulnerable to oil price shocks in comparison to earlier decades. Conclusion¶ This paper examines the impact of oil price changes on global economic growth. Unlike some of the recent studies, this paper finds that oil price rises have had significant negative impact on world economic growth rates.¶ A time-series analysis of the data from 1971 to 2010 finds that an increase in real oil price by one dollar is associated with a reduction of world economic growth rate by between 0.04 and 0.1% in the following year. Therefore, an increase in real oil price by 10 dollars would be associated with a reduction of world economic growth rate by between 0.4 and 1% in the following year. For a global economy that in average grows at about 3.5% a year, a reduction of this size is very significant.¶ Moreover, the regressions seem to have suggested that the impact of oil price on economic growth may have increased over the last one or two decades. This is in contradiction with the widely held belief that the global economy has become less vulnerable to oil price shocks.¶ These findings suggest that if the world oil production does peak and start to decline in the near future, it may impose a serious and possibly an insurmountable speed limit on the pace of global economic expansion.

**That causes nuclear war**

Merlini, 11

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. **One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into** an open and **traditional conflict between states, perhaps** even **involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of** the global **economic and financial system**, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, **and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first**. Whatever the trigger, **the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference** would self-interest and rejection of outside interference **would** likely **be amplified, emptying**, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of **multilateralism**, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. F**amiliar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated**. One way or another, the **secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes**, competing or **converging with** secular absolutes such as **unbridled nationalism.**

# Advantage Two: Modeling

#### Current drone usage guarantees rapid drone prolif that escalates—the plan is the only way to prevent miscalc—we’re on the brink now

Roberts, 13

(Kristin, News Editor for National Journal and masters in security studies from Georgetown and masters in journalism from Columbia, "When the Whole World Has Drones", March 22, [www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321](http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321) NL)

The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States government and its closest allies. The aircraft are too easy to obtain, with barriers to entry on the production side crumbling too quickly to place limits on the spread of a technology that promises to transform warfare on a global scale. Already, more than 75 countries have remote piloted aircraft. More than 50 nations are building a total of nearly a thousand types. At its last display at a trade show in Beijing, China showed off 25 different unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines.¶ It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: An advanced country and its weapons developers create a tool, and then others learn how to make their own. But what makes this case rare, and dangerous, is the powerful combination of efficiency and lethality spreading in an environment lacking internationally accepted guidelines on legitimate use. This technology is snowballing through a global arena where the main precedent for its application is the one set by the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following.¶ America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts.¶ To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has given friends and foes a green light to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only affect relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order.¶ Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.¶ This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.¶ THE WRONG QUESTION¶ The United States is the indisputable leader in drone technology and long-range strike. Remote-piloted aircraft have given Washington an extraordinary ability to wage war with far greater precision, improved effect, and fewer unintended casualties than conventional warfare. The drones allow U.S. forces to establish ever greater control over combat areas, and the Pentagon sees the technology as an efficient and judicious force of the future. And it should, given the billions of dollars that have gone into establishing and maintaining such a capability.¶ That level of superiority leads some national security officials to downplay concerns about other nations’ unmanned systems and to too narrowly define potential threats to the homeland. As proof, they argue that American dominance in drone warfare is due only in part to the aircraft itself, which offers the ability to travel great distances and loiter for long periods, not to mention carry and launch Hellfire missiles. The drone itself, they argue, is just a tool and, yes, one that is being copied aggressively by allies and adversaries alike. The real edge, they say, is in the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis underpinning the aircraft’s mission.¶ “There is what I think is just an unconstrained focus on a tool as opposed to the subject of the issue, the tool of remotely piloted aircraft that in fact provide for greater degrees of surety before you employ force than anything else we use,” said retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, the Air Force’s first deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. “I think people don’t realize that for the medium altitude aircraft—the MQ-1 [Predator] and MQ-9 [Reaper] that are generally written about in the press—there are over 200 people involved in just one orbit of those aircraft.… The majority of those people are analysts who are interpreting the information that’s coming off the sensors on the aircraft.”¶ The analysts are part of the global architecture that makes precision strikes, and targeted killing, possible. At the front end, obviously, intelligence—military, CIA, and local—inform target decisions. But in as near-real time as technologically possible, intel analysts in Nevada, Texas, Virginia, and other locations watch the data flood in from the aircraft and make calls on what’s happening on target. They monitor the footage, listen to audio, and analyze signals, giving decision-makers time to adjust an operation if the risks (often counted in potential civilian deaths) outweigh the reward (judged by the value of the threat eliminated).¶ “Is that a shovel or a rifle? Is that a Taliban member or is this a farmer? The way that warfare has advanced is that we are much more exquisite in our ability to discern,” Maj. Gen. Robert Otto, commander of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, told NationalJournal at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. “We’re not overhead for 15 minutes with a fighter that’s about to run out of gas, and we have to make a decision. We can orbit long enough to be pretty sure about our target.”¶ Other countries, groups, and even individuals can and do fly drones. But no state or group has nearly the sophisticated network of intelligence and data analysis that gives the United States its strategic advantage. Although it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that potential U.S. adversaries aspire to attain that type of war-from-afar, pinpoint-strike capability, they have neither the income nor the perceived need to do so.¶ That’s true, at least today. It’s also irrelevant. Others who employ drones are likely to carry a different agenda, one more concerned with employing a relatively inexpensive and ruthlessly efficient tool to dispatch an enemy close at hand.¶ “It would be very difficult for them to create the global-strike architecture we have, to have a control cell in Nevada flying a plane over Afghanistan. The reality is that most nations don’t want or need that,” said Peter Singer, director of the Brookings Institution’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and one of the foremost experts in advanced military technology. “Turkey’s not looking to conduct strikes into the Philippines.... But Turkey is looking to be able to carry out long-duration surveillance and potentially strike inside and right on its border.”¶ And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to conduct missions that would run afoul of U.S. interests in Iraq and the broader Middle East. Already, Beijing says it considered a strike in Myanmar to kill a drug lord wanted in the deaths of Chinese sailors. What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea? Or if India uses the aircraft to strike Lashkar-e-Taiba militants near Kashmir?¶ “We don’t like other states using lethal force outside their borders. It’s destabilizing. It can lead to a sort of wider escalation of violence between two states,” said Micah Zenko, a security policy and drone expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “So the proliferation of drones is not just about the protection of the United States. It’s primarily about the likelihood that other states will increasingly use lethal force outside of their borders.”¶ LOWERING THE BAR¶ Governments have covertly killed for ages, whether they maintained an official hit list or not. Before the Obama administration’s “disposition matrix,” Israel was among the best-known examples of a state that engaged, and continues to engage, in strikes to eliminate people identified by its intelligence as plotting attacks against it. But Israel certainly is not alone. Turkey has killed Kurds in Northern Iraq. Some American security experts point to Russia as well, although Moscow disputes this.¶ In the 1960s, the U.S. government was involved to differing levels in plots to assassinate leaders in Congo and the Dominican Republic, and, famously, Fidel Castro in Cuba. The Church Committee’s investigation and subsequent 1975 report on those and other suspected plots led to the standing U.S. ban on assassination. So, from 1976 until the start of President George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” the United States did not conduct targeted killings, because it was considered anathema to American foreign policy. (In fact, until as late as 2001, Washington’s stated policy was to oppose Israel’s targeted killings.)¶ When America adopted targeted killing again—first under the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks and then expanded by President Obama—the tools of the trade had changed. No longer was the CIA sending poison, pistols, and toxic cigars to assets overseas to kill enemy leaders. Now it could target people throughout al-Qaida’s hierarchy with accuracy, deliver lethal ordnance literally around the world, and watch the mission’s completion in real time.¶ The United States is smartly using technology to improve combat efficacy, and to make war-fighting more efficient, both in money and manpower. It has been able to conduct more than 400 lethal strikes, killing more than 3,500 people, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa using drones; reducing risk to U.S. personnel; and giving the Pentagon flexibility to use special-forces units elsewhere. And, no matter what human-rights groups say, it’s clear that drone use has reduced the number of civilians killed in combat relative to earlier conflicts. Washington would be foolish not to exploit unmanned aircraft in its long fight against terrorism. In fact, defense hawks and spendthrifts alike would criticize it if it did not.¶ “If you believe that these folks are legitimate terrorists who are committing acts of aggressive, potential violent acts against the United States or our allies or our citizens overseas, should it matter how we choose to engage in the self-defense of the United States?” asked Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. “Do we have that debate when a special-forces team goes in? Do we have that debate if a tank round does it? Do we have the debate if an aircraft pilot drops a particular bomb?”¶ But defense analysts argue—and military officials concede—there is a qualitative difference between dropping a team of men into Yemen and green-lighting a Predator flight from Nevada. Drones lower the threshold for military action. That’s why, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, unmanned aircraft have conducted 95 percent of all U.S. targeted killings. Almost certainly, if drones were unavailable, the United States would not have pursued an equivalent number of manned strikes in Pakistan.¶ And what’s true for the United States will be true as well for other countries that own and arm remote piloted aircraft.¶ “The drones—the responsiveness, the persistence, and without putting your personnel at risk—is what makes it a different technology,” Zenko said. “When other states have this technology, if they follow U.S. practice, it will lower the threshold for their uses of lethal force outside their borders. So they will be more likely to conduct targeted killings than they have in the past.”¶ The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge.¶ Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules to govern the program. Most members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees say they are confident the defense and intelligence communities have set an adequate evidentiary bar for determining when a member of al-Qaida or an affiliated group may be added to the target list, for example, and say that the rigor of the process gives them comfort in the level of program oversight within the executive branch. “They’re not drawing names out of a hat here,” Rogers said. “It is very specific intel-gathering and other things that would lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government.”¶ BEHIND CLOSED DOORS¶ The argument against public debate is easy enough to understand: Operational secrecy is necessary, and total opacity is easier. “I don’t think there is enough transparency and justification so that we remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things,” said Dennis Blair, Obama’s former director of national intelligence. “The reason it’s not been undertaken by the administration is that they just make a cold-blooded calculation that it’s better to hunker down and take the criticism than it is to get into the public debate, which is going to be a hard one to win.”¶ But by keeping legal and policy positions secret, only partially sharing information even with congressional oversight committees, and declining to open a public discussion about drone use, the president and his team are asking the world to just trust that America is getting this right. While some will, many people, especially outside the United States, will see that approach as hypocritical, coming from a government that calls for transparency and the rule of law elsewhere.¶ “I know these people, and I know how much they really, really attend to the most important details of the job,” said Barry Pavel, a former defense and security official in the Bush and Obama administrations who is director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. “If I didn’t have that personal knowledge and because there isn’t that much really in the press, then I would be giving you a different rendering, and much more uncertain rendering.”¶ That’s only part of the problem with the White House’s trust-us approach. The other resides in the vast distance between the criteria and authorization the administration says it uses in the combat drone program and the reality on the ground. For example, according to administration officials, before a person is added to the targeted strike list, specific criteria should be met. The target should be a 1) senior, 2) operational 3) leader of al-Qaida or an affiliated group who presents 4) an imminent threat of violent attack 5) against the United States.¶ But that’s not who is being targeted.¶ Setting aside the administration’s redefining of “imminence” beyond all recognition, the majority of the 3,500-plus people killed by U.S. drones worldwide were not leaders of al-Qaida or the Taliban; they were low- or mid-level foot soldiers. Most were not plotting attacks against the United States. In Yemen and North Africa, the Obama administration is deploying weaponized drones to take out targets who are more of a threat to local governments than to Washington, according to defense and regional security experts who closely track unrest in those areas. In some cases, Washington appears to be in the business of using its drone capabilities mostly to assist other countries, not to deter strikes against the United States (another precedent that might be eagerly seized upon in the future).¶ U.S. defense and intelligence officials reject any suggestion that the targets are not legitimate. One thing they do not contest, however, is that the administration’s reliance on the post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force as legal cover for a drone-strike program that has extended well beyond al-Qaida in Afghanistan or Pakistan is dodgy. The threat that the United States is trying to deal with today has an ever more tenuous connection to Sept. 11. (None of the intelligence officials reached for this article would speak on the record.) But instead of asking Congress to consider extending its authorization, as some officials have mulled, the administration’s legal counsel has chosen instead to rely on Nixon administration adviser John Stevenson’s 1970 justification of the bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, an action new Secretary of State John Kerry criticized during his confirmation hearing this year.¶ Human-rights groups might be loudest in their criticism of both the program and the opaque policy surrounding it, but even the few lawmakers who have access to the intelligence the administration shares have a hard time coping with the dearth of information. “We can’t always assume we’re going to have responsible people with whom we agree and trust in these positions,” said Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, who sits on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “The essence of the Constitution is, it shouldn’t matter who is in charge; they’re still constrained by principles and rules of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights.”¶ PEER PRESSURE¶ Obama promised in his 2013 State of the Union to increase the drone program’s transparency. “In the months ahead, I will continue to engage Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world,” the president said on Feb. 12. Since then, the administration, under pressure from allies on Senate Intelligence, agreed to release all of the legal memos the Justice Department drafted in support of targeted killing.¶ But, beyond that, it’s not certain Obama will do anything more to shine light on this program. Except in situations where leaks help it tell a politically expedient story of its skill at killing bad guys, the administration has done little to make a case to the public and the world at large for its use of armed drones.¶ Already, what’s become apparent is that the White House is not interested in changing much about the way it communicates strike policy. (It took Sen. Rand Paul’s 13-hour filibuster of CIA Director John Brennan’s nomination to force the administration to concede that it doesn’t have the right to use drones to kill noncombatant Americans on U.S. soil.) And government officials, as well as their surrogates on security issues, are actively trying to squash expectations that the administration would agree to bring the judicial branch into the oversight mix. Indeed, judicial review of any piece of the program is largely off the table now, according to intelligence officials and committee members.¶ Under discussion within the administration and on Capitol Hill is a potential program takeover by the Pentagon, removing the CIA from its post-9/11 role of executing military-like strikes. Ostensibly, that shift could help lift the secret-by-association-with-CIA attribute of the program that some officials say has kept them from more freely talking about the legitimate military use of drones for counterterrorism operations. But such a fix would provide no guarantee of greater transparency for the public, or even Congress.¶ And if the administration is not willing to share with lawmakers who are security-cleared to know, it certainly is not prepared to engage in a sensitive discussion, even among allies, that might begin to set the rules on use for a technology that could upend stability in already fragile and strategically significant places around the globe. Time is running out to do so.¶ “The history of technology development like this is, you never maintain your lead very long. Somebody always gets it,” said David Berteau, director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They’re going to become cheaper. They’re going to become easier. They’re going to become interoperable,” he said. “The destabilizing effects are very, very serious.”¶ Berteau is not alone. Zenko, of the Council on Foreign Relations, has urged officials to quickly establish norms. Singer, at Brookings, argues that the window of opportunity for the United States to create stability-supporting precedent is quickly closing. The problem is, the administration is not thinking far enough down the line, according to a Senate Intelligence aide. Administration officials “are thinking about the next four years, and we’re thinking about the next 40 years. And those two different angles on this question are why you see them in conflict right now.”¶ That’s in part a symptom of the “technological optimism” that often plagues the U.S. security community when it establishes a lead over its competitors, noted Georgetown University’s Kai-Henrik Barth. After the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was sure it would be decades before the Soviets developed a nuclear-weapon capability. It took four years.¶ With drones, the question is how long before the dozens of states with the aircraft can arm and then operate a weaponized version. “Pretty much every nation has gone down the pathway of, ‘This is science fiction; we don’t want this stuff,’ to, ‘OK, we want them, but we’ll just use them for surveillance,’ to, ‘Hmm, they’re really useful when you see the bad guy and can do something about it, so we’ll arm them,’ ” Singer said. He listed the countries that have gone that route: the United States, Britain, Italy, Germany, China. “Consistently, nations have gone down the pathway of first only surveillance and then arming.”¶ The opportunity to write rules that might at least guide, if not restrain, the world’s view of acceptable drone use remains, not least because this is in essence a conventional arms-control issue. The international Missile Technology Control Regime attempts to restrict exports of unmanned vehicles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, but it is voluntary and nonbinding, and it’s under attack by the drone industry as a drag on business. Further, the technology itself, especially when coupled with data and real-time analytics, offers the luxury of time and distance that could allow officials to raise the evidentiary bar for strikes—to be closer to certain that their target is the right one.¶ But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing control regime, or creating a new control agreement (which is never easy to pull off absent a bad-state actor threatening attack), just the process of lining up U.S. policy with U.S. practice would go a long way toward establishing the kind of precedent on use of this technology that America—in five, 10, or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions.¶ A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, Dennis Blair among them, thinks norms play little to no role in global security. And they have evidence in support. The missile-technology regime, for example, might be credited with slowing some program development, but it certainly has not stopped non-signatories—North Korea and Iran—from buying, building, and selling missile systems. But norms established by technology-leading countries, even when not written into legal agreements among nations, have shown success in containing the use and spread of some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs.¶ Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the United States. “History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past,” Zenko argued. Despite the legal and policy complexity of this issue, it is something the American people have, if slowly, come to care about. Given the attention that Rand Paul’s filibuster garnered, it is not inconceivable that public pressure on drone operations could force the kind of unforeseen change to U.S. policy that it did most recently on “enhanced interrogation” of terrorists.¶ The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring American options while doing little good elsewhere—as if other countries aren’t closely watching this debate and taking notes for their own future policymaking. But the White House’s refusal to answer questions about its drone use with anything but “no comment” ensures that the rest of the world is free to fill in the blanks where and when it chooses. And the United States will have already surrendered the moment in which it could have provided not just a technical operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.

#### There are numerous ways nuclear miscalc will ensue

**Boyle, 13**

(Michael, PhD from Cambridge and assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare", 2013, [www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf) NL)

**An important, but overlooked, strategic consequence of the Obama administration’s embrace of drones** is that it **has generated a new and dangerous arms race** ¶ **for this technology**. At present, the use of lethal drones is seen as acceptable to ¶ US policy-makers because no other state possesses the ability to make highly ¶ sophisticated drones with the range, surveillance capability and lethality of those ¶ currently manufactured by the United States. Yet **the rest of the world is not far** ¶ **behind. At least 76 countries have acquired UAV technology, including Russia,** ¶ **China, Pakistan and India.**120 **China is reported to have at least 25 separate drone** ¶ **systems currently in development**.121 At present, there are 680 drone programmes ¶ in the world, an increase of over 400 since 2005.122 **Many states and non-state** ¶ **actors hostile to the United States have begun to dabble in drone technology. Iran** ¶ **has created its own drone, dubbed the ‘Ambassador of Death’, which has a range** ¶ **of up to 600 miles**.123 **Iran has also allegedly supplied the Assad regime in Syria** ¶ **with drone technology**.124 Hezbollah launched an Iranian-made drone into Israeli ¶ territory, where it was shot down by the Israeli air force in October 2012.125¶ **A global arms race** for drone technology **is** already **under way**. According to ¶ one estimate, global spending on drones is likely to be more than US$94 billion by ¶ 2021.126 One factor that is facilitating the spread of drones (particularly non-lethal ¶ drones) is their cost relative to other military purchases. The top-of-the line ¶ Predator or Reaper model costs approximately US$10.5 million each, compared ¶ to the US$150 million price tag of a single F-22 fighter jet.127 At that price, drone ¶ technology is already within the reach of most developed militaries, many of ¶ which will seek to buy drones from the US or another supplier. **With demand** ¶ **growing, a number of states, including China and Israel, have begun the aggressive selling of drones, including attack drones, and Russia may also be moving** ¶ **into this market.**128 Because of concerns that export restrictions are harming US competitiveness in the drones market, the Pentagon has granted approval for ¶ drone exports to 66 governments and is currently being lobbied to authorize sales ¶ to even more.129 **The Obama administration has already authorized the sale of** ¶ **drones to the UK and Italy,** but Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been ¶ refused drone technology by congressional restrictions.130 **It is only a matter of** ¶ **time before another supplier steps in to offer the drone technology to countries** ¶ **prohibited by export controls from buying US drones**. According to a study by ¶ the Teal Group, the US will account for 62 per cent of research and development ¶ spending and 55 per cent of procurement spending on drones by 2022.131 **As the** ¶ **market expands, with new buyers and sellers, America’s ability to control the** ¶ **sale of drone technology will be diminished**. **It is likely that the US will retain a** ¶ **substantial qualitative advantage in drone technology for some time, but even that** ¶ **will fade as more suppliers offer drones that can match US capabilities.**¶ **The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term strategic** ¶ **consequences**, not all of which are favourable to the United States over the long ¶ term. First, it is now obvious that **other states will use drones in ways that are** ¶ **inconsistent with US interests.** One reason why the US has been so keen to use ¶ drone technology in Pakistan and Yemen is that at present it retains a substantial ¶ advantage in high-quality attack drones. Many of the other states now capable ¶ of employing drones of near-equivalent technology—for example, the UK and ¶ Israel—are considered allies. But this situation is quickly changing as other leading ¶ geopolitical players, such as Russia and China, are beginning rapidly to develop ¶ and deploy drones for their own purposes. While its own technology still lags ¶ behind that of the US, Russia has spent huge sums on purchasing drones and has ¶ recently sought to buy the Israeli-made Eitan drone capable of surveillance and ¶ firing air-to-surface missiles.132 China has begun to develop UAVs for reconnaissance and combat and has several new drones capable of long-range surveillance ¶ and attack under development.133 China is also planning to use unmanned surveillance drones to allow it to monitor the disputed East China Sea Islands, which are ¶ currently under dispute with Japan and Taiwan.134 Both Russia and China will ¶ pursue this technology and develop their own drone suppliers which will sell to ¶ the highest bidder, presumably with fewer export controls than those imposed ¶ by the US Congress. Once both governments have equivalent or near-equivalent ¶ levels of drone technology to the United States, they will be similarly tempted ¶ to use it for surveillance or attack in the way the US has done. Thus, through ¶ its own over-reliance on drones in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, the US ¶ may be hastening the arrival of a world where its qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed **and where this technology will be used and sold by rival** ¶ **Great Powers** whose interests do not mirror its own.¶ **A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional** ¶ **concepts which have underwritten stability in the international system will be** ¶ **radically reshaped by drone technology.** For example, **much of the stability** ¶ **among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by** deterrence, ¶ specifically **nuclear deterrence**.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the ¶ game and tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding nuclear ¶ weapons, may and may not do to one another.136 While it is widely understood ¶ that nuclear-capable states will conduct aerial surveillance and spy on one another, ¶ **overt military confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they are** ¶ **assumed to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these** ¶ **states will exercise the same level of restraint with drone surveillance**, which is ¶ unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable. **States may be more willing to engage** ¶ **in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals**, or engage in ‘salami ¶ tactics’ to see what kind of drone-led incursion, if any, will motivate a response.137¶ This may have been Hezbollah’s logic in sending a drone into Israeli airspace in ¶ October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.138 After ¶ the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted that the drone incident demonstrated their military capabilities.139 **One could imagine two rival states—for** ¶ **example, India and Pakistan—deploying drones to test each other’s capability** ¶ **and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were misinterpreted by** ¶ **the other as an attack.** As drones get physically smaller and more precise, and as ¶ they develop a greater flying range, the temptation to use them to spy on a rival’s ¶ nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to resist. If ¶ this were to happen, **drones might gradually erode the deterrent relationships that** ¶ **exist between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict** ¶ **between them**.¶ Another dimension of this problem has to do with the risk of accident. **Drones** ¶ **are prone to accidents and crashes**. By July 2010, the US Air Force had identified ¶ approximately 79 drone accidents.140 Recently released documents have revealed ¶ that there have been a number of drone accidents and crashes in the Seychelles ¶ and Djibouti, some of which happened in close proximity to civilian airports.141¶ **The rapid proliferation of drones worldwide will involve a risk of accident to civilian aircraft, possibly producing an international incident if such an accident** ¶ **were to involve an aircraft affiliated to a state hostile to the owner of the drone**. ¶ **Most of the drone accidents may be innocuous, but some will carry strategic risks**. ¶ In December 2011, a CIA drone designed for nuclear surveillance crashed in Iran, ¶ revealing the existence of the spying programme and leaving sensitive technology ¶ in the hands of the Iranian government.142 **The expansion of drone technology** ¶ **raises the possibility that some of these surveillance drones will be interpreted as** ¶ **attack drones, or that an accident or crash will spiral out of control and lead to** ¶ **an armed confrontation.**143 An accident would be even more dangerous if the US ¶ were to pursue its plans for nuclear-powered drones, which can spread radioactive ¶ material like a dirty bomb if they crash.144¶ Third, **lethal drones create the possibility that the norms on the use of force** ¶ **will erode, creating a much more dangerous world and pushing the international** ¶ **system back towards the rule of the jungle**. To some extent, this world is already ¶ being ushered in by the United States, which has set a dangerous precedent that a ¶ state may simply kill foreign citizens considered a threat without a declaration of ¶ war. Even John Brennan has recognized that the US is ‘establishing a precedent ¶ that other nations may follow’.145 Given this precedent, there is nothing to stop ¶ other states from following the American lead and using drone strikes to eliminate ¶ potential threats. Those ‘threats’ need not be terrorists, but could be others—¶ dissidents, spies, even journalists—whose behaviour threatens a government. ¶ **One danger is that drone use might undermine the normative prohibition on** ¶ **the assassination of leaders and government officials that most** (but not all) **states** ¶ **currently respect. A greater danger, however, is that the US will have normalized** ¶ **murder as a tool of statecraft and created a world where states can increasingly take** ¶ **vengeance on individuals outside their borders without the niceties of extradition,** ¶ **due process or trial.**146 As some of its critics have noted, the Obama administration ¶ may have created a world where states will find it easier to kill terrorists rather ¶ than capture them and deal with all of the legal and evidentiary difficulties associated with giving them a fair trial.147¶ Fourth, **there is a distinct danger that the world will divide into two camps:** ¶ **developed states in possession of drone technology, and weak states and rebel movements that lack them. States with recurring separatist or insurgent problems** ¶ **may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes**, essentially ¶ containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely ¶ punitive policy against them. One could easily imagine that China, for example, ¶ might resort to drone strikes in Uighur provinces in order to keep potential threats ¶ from emerging, or that Russia could use drones to strike at separatist movements ¶ in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such behaviour would not necessarily be confined to ¶ authoritarian governments; it is equally possible that Israel might use drones to ¶ police Gaza and the West Bank, thus reducing the vulnerability of Israeli soldiers ¶ to Palestinian attacks on the ground. The extent to which Israel might be willing ¶ to use drones in combat and surveillance was revealed in its November 2012 attack ¶ on Gaza. Israel allegedly used a drone to assassinate the Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari ¶ and employed a number of armed drones for strikes in a way that was described ¶ as ‘unprecedented’ by senior Israeli officials.148 It is not hard to imagine Israel ¶ concluding that drones over Gaza were the best way to deal with the problem ¶ of Hamas, even if their use left the Palestinian population subject to constant, ¶ unnerving surveillance. **All of the consequences of such a sharp division between** ¶ **the haves and have-nots with drone technology is hard to assess, but one possibility is that governments with secessionist movements might be less willing to** ¶ **negotiate and grant concessions if drones allowed them to police their internal** ¶ **enemies with ruthless efficiency and ‘manage’ the problem at low cost**. The result ¶ might be a situation where such conflicts are contained but not resolved, while ¶ citizens in developed states grow increasingly indifferent to the suffering of those ¶ making secessionist or even national liberation claims, including just ones, upon ¶ them.¶ Finally, **drones have the capacity to strengthen the surveillance capacity of** ¶ **both democracies and authoritarian regimes, with significant consequences for** ¶ **civil liberties.** In the UK, BAE Systems is adapting military-designed drones ¶ for a range of civilian policing tasks including ‘monitoring antisocial motorists, ¶ protesters, agricultural thieves and fly-tippers’.149 Such drones are also envisioned ¶ as monitoring Britain’s shores for illegal immigration and drug smuggling. In the ¶ United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued 61 permits for ¶ domestic drone use between November 2006 and June 2011, mainly to local and ¶ state police, but also to federal agencies and even universities.150 According to ¶ one FAA estimate, the US will have 30,000 drones patrolling the skies by 2022.151¶ Similarly, the European Commission will spend US$260 million on Eurosur, a new programme that will use drones to patrol the Mediterranean coast.152 The ¶ risk that drones will turn democracies into ‘surveillance states’ is well known, ¶ but the risks for authoritarian regimes may be even more severe. Authoritarian ¶ states, particularly those that face serious internal opposition, may tap into drone ¶ technology now available to monitor and ruthlessly punish their opponents. ¶ In semi-authoritarian Russia, for example, drones have already been employed ¶ to monitor pro-democracy protesters.153 One could only imagine what a truly ¶ murderous authoritarian regime—such as Bashar al-Assad’s Syria—would do ¶ with its own fleet of drones. The expansion of drone technology may make the ¶ strong even stronger, thus tilting the balance of power in authoritarian regimes ¶ even more decisively towards those who wield the coercive instruments of power ¶ and against those who dare to challenge them.

#### Drones create adventurism – triggers war

Singer, 09

(Peter Warren Singer is an American Political Scientist and international relations scholar, he is currently a senior fellow at the Brookings institution, where he is the director of the 21st century Defense Initiative; “Robots at War: The New Battlefield’; Winter 2009; <http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article.cfm?aid=1313>; 6/29/2010 THIS EVIDENCE IS GENDER MODIFIED)

Such changed connections don’t just make a public less likely to wield its veto power over its elected leaders. As Lawrence Korb observed, they also alter the calculations of the leaders themselves. Nations often go to war because of overconfidence. This makes perfect sense; few leaders choose to start a conflict thinking they will lose. Historians have found that technology can play a big role in feeding overconfidence: New weapons and capabilities breed new perceptions, as well as misperceptions, about what might be possible in a war. Today’s new technologies are particularly likely to feed overconfidence. They are perceived to help the offensive side in a war more than the defense, plus, they are improving at an exponential pace. The difference of just a few years of research and development can create vast differences in weapons’ capabilities. But this can generate a sort of “use it or lose it” mentality, as even the best of technological advantages can prove fleeting (and the United States has reasons for concern, as 42 countries are now working on military robotics, from Iran and China to Belarus and Pakistan). Finally, as one roboticist explains, a vicious circle is generated. Scientists and companies often overstate the value of new technologies in order to get governments to buy them, but if leaders believe the hype, they may be more likely to feel adventurous. James Der Derian is an expert at Brown University on new modes of war. He believes that the combination of these factors means that robotics will “lower the threshold for violence.” The result is a dangerous mixture: leaders unchecked by a public veto now gone missing, combined with technologies that seem to offer spectacular results with few lives lost. It’s a brew that could prove very seductive to decision makers. “If one can argue that such new technologies will offer less harm to us and them, then it is more likely that we’ll reach for them early, rather than spending weeks and months slogging at diplomacy.” When faced with a dispute or crisis, policymakers have typically regarded the use of force as the “option of last resort.” Un[personed] manned systems might now help that option move up the list, with each upward step making war more likely. That returns us to Korb’s scenario of “more Kosovos, less Iraqs.” While avoiding the mistakes of Iraq certainly sounds like a positive result, the other side of the tradeoff would not be without problems. The 1990s were not the halcyon days some recall. Lowering the bar to allow for more un[personed] manned strikes from afar would lead to an approach resembling the “cruise missile diplomacy” of that period. Such a strategy may leave fewer troops stuck on the ground, but, as shown by the strikes against Al Qaeda camps in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, the Kosovo war in 1999, and perhaps now the drone strikes in Pakistan, it produces military action without any true sense of a commitment, lash-outs that yield incomplete victories at best. As one U.S. Army report notes, such operations “feel good for a time, but accomplish little.” They involve the country in a problem, but do not resolve it. Even worse, Korb may be wrong, and the dynamic may yield not fewer Iraqs but more of them. It was the lure of an easy preemptive action that helped get the United States into such trouble in Iraq in the first place. As one robotics scientist says of the new technology he is building, “The military thinks that it will allow them to nip things in the bud, deal with the bad guys earlier and easier, rather than having to get into a big-ass war. But the most likely thing that will happen is that we’ll be throwing a bunch of high tech against the usual urban guerillas . . .. It will stem the tide [of U.S. casualties], but it won’t give us some asymmetric advantage.” Thus, robots may entail a dark irony. By appearing to lower the human costs of war, they may seduce us into more wars.

**China is starting to use drones now—that causes a Senkaku conflict**

CBS News, 5/3

(CBS News, “China emerges as new force in drone warfare,”5/3/13, <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57582699/china-emerges-as-new-force-in-drone-warfare/>, 6/19/13, EGM)

Determined to kill or capture a murderous Mekong River drug lord, China's security forces considered a tactic they'd never tried before: calling a drone strike on his remote hideaway deep in the hills of Myanmar. The attack didn't happen — the man was later captured and brought to China for trial — but the fact that authorities were considering such an option cast new light on China's unmanned aerial vehicle program, which has been quietly percolating for years and now appears to be moving into overdrive. **Chinese aerospace firms have developed dozens of drones**, known also as unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. Many have appeared at air shows and military parades, including some that bear an uncanny resemblance to the Predator, Global Hawk and Reaper models used with deadly effect by the U.S. Air Force and CIA. Analysts say that although China still trails the U.S. and Israel, the industry leaders, **its technology is maturing rapidly and on the cusp of widespread use** for surveillance and combat strikes. "My sense is that China is moving into large-scale deployments of UAVs," said Ian Easton, co-author of a recent report on Chinese drones for the Project 2049 Institute security think tank. **China's move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military's growing sophistication and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific.** It also could elevate the threat to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict. **China's increased use of drones also adds to concerns about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks.** The United States has widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. **"China is following the precedent set by the U.S.** The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we. They're a big country with security interests and so are we'," said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI. "The justification for an attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. **There needs to be agreement on what the limits are,"** he said. Though **China** claims its military posture is entirely defensive, its navy and civilian maritime services have engaged in repeated standoffs with ships from other nations in the South China and East China seas. India, meanwhile, says Chinese troops have set up camp almost 20 kilometers (12 miles) into Indian-claimed territory. It isn't yet known exactly what China's latest drones are capable of, because, like most Chinese equipment, they remain untested in battle. The military and associated aerospace firms have offered little information, although in an interview last month with the official Xinhua News Agency, Yang Baikui, chief designer at plane maker COSIC, said Chinese drones were closing the gap but still needed to progress in half a dozen major areas, from airframe design to digital linkups. Executives at COSIC and drone makers ASN, Avic, and the 611 Institute declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press, citing their military links. The Defense Ministry's latest report on the status of the military released in mid-April made no mention of drones, and spokesman Yang Yujun made only the barest acknowledgement of their existence in response to a question. "Drones are a new high-tech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world," Yang said. "China's armed forces are developing weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security and world peace. It will pose no threat to any country." **Drones are already patrolling China's borders,** and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance following last month's deadly earthquake there. **They may** also **soon be appearing over China's maritime claims**, **including Japanese-controlled East China Sea islands** that China considers its own. **That could sharpen tensions in an area where Chinese and Japanese** patrol boats **already confront each** **other on a regular basis and Japan frequently scrambles fighters to tail Chinese manned aircraft**. Retired Maj. Gen. Peng Guoqian told state media in January that **drones were already being used to photograph and conduct surveillance over** the islands, called Diaoyu by China and **Senkaku** by Japan. The Pentagon says Chinese drones could boost the effectiveness of long-range radar in monitoring activity and locating targets in the western Pacific far from the Chinese coast. Their missions could include guiding home an anti-ship ballistic missile known in military circles as a "carrier killer," the Pentagon said in its 2012 report on China's military. Reports about the search for notorious river bandit Naw Kham, wanted for the 2011 murders of 13 Chinese sailors, offer some clues about China's plans for drones. The head of the Chinese Public Security Ministry's anti-narcotics bureau, Liu Yuejin, was quoted by state media as saying a plan had been floated to target Naw Kham's fortified camp with a drone loaded with 20 kilograms of TNT. The type of drone wasn't mentioned. The plan was dropped by higher-ups in favor of taking Naw Kham alive, but the revelation served as a statement of Chinese intentions and capabilities. China began developing drones in the 1960s and is believed to have used them for reconnaissance during its brief 1979 invasion of Vietnam. The program was aided by the adaptation of foreign civilian or dual-use UAVs for military purposes, then took a leap forward with the purchase of Harpy drones from Israel. Later, U.S. opposition to Israeli upgrades on the Harpys spurred China to build its own version. China's gains are aided by the industry's relatively low costs and short production schedule and boosted by the assembly of the country's homebuilt Beidou navigation satellite system and improved high-speed data links. **China's military is expected to field hundreds, if not thousands, of drones**, although the overall size of the fleet is difficult to estimate and the U.S. will ultimately have many more. Chinese UAVs range from simple propeller-driven models to the high-concept, stealthy Dark Sword, featuring a joined wing and tail assembly similar to the U.S. Avenger. More than 90 percent of the Chinese drones now in service are variants on the simpler ASN-209 surveillance drone seen in navy drills and which are now being produced under license by Egypt. Others include the Wing Loong, or Pterodactyl, which bears a striking resemblance to the U.S. Reaper and carries a brace of missiles. Chinese media reports and air show staff say it has been exported to countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, possibly the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan, at just a fraction of the Reaper's price tag of $30 million each. Military officials in the UAE and Uzbekistan declined to comment on the reports. Another combat drone being offered for export, the CH-4, has space for four missiles and is said to be able to fly continuously for 30 hours. Even more ambitious is the Xiang Long BZK-005, similar to the U.S. Global Hawk. It has a reported 6,437-kilometer (4,000-mile) range and is roughly the size of a medium-size fighter jet. Deployment may be some time off, however, and a 2011 crash points to rumored problems with the guidance system. **Further developments could see China competing with** world's two **major drone producers,** the United States and Israel, **for markets in close ally Pakistan**, Myanmar and other developing nations. **Customers might even include Russia, which is the world's No. 2 arms exporter** but has had little success making UAVs. There are some indications **China may already be exporting know-how to Pakistan**, given design similarities between Chinese drones and Pakistan's Shahpar UAV, said Huw Williams, an expert on drones at Jane's Defence Weekly. However, Williams said China will likely struggle to find customers for its larger drones, given limited demand and the large number of countries developing such systems of their own. "They're very interested in getting into this market," SIPRI's Wezeman said. "Another few years and they will have caught up."

**Senkaku conflict escalates**

Klare, 13

(Michael, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College "The Next War", Jan 23, [www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/23/the\_next\_war\_100500-2.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/23/the_next_war_100500-2.html)) NL

Don't look now, but conditions are deteriorating in the western Pacific. Things are turning ugly, with consequences that could prove deadly and spell catastrophe for the global economy. In Washington, it is widely assumed that a showdown with Iran over its nuclear ambitions will be the first major crisis to engulf the next secretary of defense -- whether it be former Senator Chuck Hagel, as President Obama desires, or someone else if he fails to win Senate confirmation. With few signs of an imminent breakthrough in talks aimed at peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, many analysts believe that military action -- if not by Israel, then by the United States -- could be on this year's agenda. Lurking just behind the Iranian imbroglio, however, is a potential crisis of far greater magnitude, and potentially far more imminent than most of us imagine. China's determination to assert control over disputed islands in the potentially energy-rich waters of the East and South China Seas, in the face of stiffening resistance from Japan and the Philippines along with greater regional assertiveness by the United States, spells trouble not just regionally, but potentially globally. Islands, Islands, Everywhere The possibility of an Iranian crisis remains in the spotlight because of the obvious risk of disorder in the Greater Middle East and its threat to global oil production and shipping. A crisis in the East or South China Seas (essentially, western extensions of the Pacific Ocean) would, however, pose a greater peril because of the possibility of a U.S.-China military confrontation and the threat to Asian economic stability. The United States is bound by treaty to come to the assistance of Japan or the Philippines if either country is attacked by a third party, so any armed clash between Chinese and Japanese or Filipino forces could trigger American military intervention. With so much of the world's trade focused on Asia, and the American, Chinese, and Japanese economies tied so closely together in ways too essential to ignore, a clash of almost any sort in these vital waterways might paralyze international commerce and trigger a global recession (or worse). All of this should be painfully obvious and so rule out such a possibility -- and yet the likelihood of such a clash occurring has been on the rise in recent months, as China and its neighbors continue to ratchet up the bellicosity of their statements and bolster their military forces in the contested areas. Washington's continuing statements about its ongoing plans for a "pivot" to, or "rebalancing" of, its forces in the Pacific have only fueled Chinese intransigence and intensified a rising sense of crisis in the region. Leaders on all sides continue to affirm their country's inviolable rights to the contested islands and vow to use any means necessary to resist encroachment by rival claimants. In the meantime, China has increased the frequency and scale of its naval maneuvers in waters claimed by Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, further enflaming tensions in the region. Ostensibly, these disputes revolve around the question of who owns a constellation of largely uninhabited atolls and islets claimed by a variety of nations. In the East China Sea, the islands in contention are called the Diaoyus by China and the Senkakus by Japan. At present, they are administered by Japan, but both countries claim sovereignty over them. In the South China Sea, several island groups are in contention, including the Spratly chain and the Paracel Islands (known in China as the Nansha and Xisha Islands, respectively). China claims all of these islets, while Vietnam claims some of the Spratlys and Paracels. Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines also claim some of the Spratlys. Far more is, of course, at stake than just the ownership of a few uninhabited islets. The seabeds surrounding them are believed to sit atop vast reserves of oil and natural gas. Ownership of the islands would naturally confer ownership of the reserves -- something all of these countries desperately desire. Powerful forces of nationalism are also at work: with rising popular fervor, the Chinese believe that the islands are part of their national territory and any other claims represent a direct assault on China's sovereign rights; the fact that Japan -- China's brutal invader and occupier during World War II -- is a rival claimant to some of them only adds a powerful tinge of victimhood to Chinese nationalism and intransigence on the issue. By the same token, the Japanese, Vietnamese, and Filipinos, already feeling threatened by China's growing wealth and power, believe no less firmly that not bending on the island disputes is an essential expression of their nationhood. Long ongoing, these disputes have escalated recently. In May 2011, for instance, the Vietnamese reported that Chinese warships were harassing oil-exploration vessels operated by the state-owned energy company PetroVietnam in the South China Sea. In two instances, Vietnamese authorities claimed, cables attached to underwater survey equipment were purposely slashed. In April 2012, armed Chinese marine surveillance ships blocked efforts by Filipino vessels to inspect Chinese boats suspected of illegally fishing off Scarborough Shoal, an islet in the South China Sea claimed by both countries. The East China Sea has similarly witnessed tense encounters of late. Last September, for example, Japanese authorities arrested 14 Chinese citizens who had attempted to land on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to press their country's claims, provoking widespread anti-Japanese protests across China and a series of naval show-of-force operations by both sides in the disputed waters. Regional diplomacy, that classic way of settling disputes in a peaceful manner, has been under growing strain recently thanks to these maritime disputes and the accompanying military encounters. In July 2012, at the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian leaders were unable to agree on a final communiqué, no matter how anodyne -- the first time that had happened in the organization's 46-year history. Reportedly, consensus on a final document was thwarted when Cambodia, a close ally of China's, refused to endorse compromise language on a proposed "code of conduct" for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. Two months later, when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Beijing in an attempt to promote negotiations on the disputes, she was reviled in the Chinese press, while officials there refused to cede any ground at all. As 2012 ended and the New Year began, the situation only deteriorated. On December 1st, officials in Hainan Province, which administers the Chinese-claimed islands in the South China Sea, announced a new policy for 2013: Chinese warships would now be empowered to stop, search, or simply repel foreign ships that entered the claimed waters and were suspected of conducting illegal activities ranging, assumedly, from fishing to oil drilling. This move coincided with an increase in the size and frequency of Chinese naval deployments in the disputed areas. On December 13th, the Japanese military scrambled F-15 fighter jets when a Chinese marine surveillance plane flew into airspace near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Another worrisome incident occurred on January 8th, when four Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese-controlled waters around those islands for 13 hours. Two days later, Japanese fighter jets were again scrambled when a Chinese surveillance plane returned to the islands. Chinese fighters then came in pursuit, the first time supersonic jets from both sides flew over the disputed area. The Chinese clearly have little intention of backing down, having indicated that they will increase their air and naval deployments in the area, just as the Japanese are doing. Powder Keg in the Pacific While war clouds gather in the Pacific sky, the question remains: Why, pray tell, is this happening now? Several factors seem to be conspiring to heighten the risk of confrontation, including leadership changes in China and Japan, and a geopolitical reassessment by the United States. \* In China, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and on what might be called national assertiveness. At the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held last November in Beijing, Xi Jinping was named both party head and chairman of the Central Military Commission, making him, in effect, the nation's foremost civilian and military official. Since then, Xi has made several heavily publicized visits to assorted Chinese military units, all clearly intended to demonstrate the Communist Party's determination, under his leadership, to boost the capabilities and prestige of the country's army, navy, and air force. He has already linked this drive to his belief that his country should play a more vigorous and assertive role in the region and the world. In a speech to soldiers in the city of Huizhou, for example, Xi spoke of his "dream" of national rejuvenation: "This dream can be said to be a dream of a strong nation; and for the military, it is the dream of a strong military." Significantly, he used the trip to visit the Haikou, a destroyer assigned to the fleet responsible for patrolling the disputed waters of the South China Sea. As he spoke, a Chinese surveillance plane entered disputed air space over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, prompting Japan to scramble those F-15 fighter jets. \* In Japan, too, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and national assertiveness. On December 16th, arch-nationalist Shinzo Abe returned to power as the nation's prime minister. Although he campaigned largely on economic issues, promising to revive the country's lagging economy, Abe has made no secret of his intent to bolster the Japanese military and assume a tougher stance on the East China Sea dispute. In his first few weeks in office, Abe has already announced plans to increase military spending and review an official apology made by a former government official to women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World War II. These steps are sure to please Japan's rightists, but certain to inflame anti-Japanese sentiment in China, Korea, and other countries it once occupied. Equally worrisome, Abe promptly negotiated an agreement with the Philippines for greater cooperation on enhanced "maritime security" in the western Pacific, a move intended to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the region. Inevitably, this will spark a harsh Chinese response -- and because the United States has mutual defense treaties with both countries, it will also increase the risk of U.S. involvement in future engagements at sea. \* In the United States, senior officials are debating implementation of the "Pacific pivot" announced by President Obama in a speech before the Australian Parliament a little over a year ago. In it, he promised that additional U.S. forces would be deployed in the region, even if that meant cutbacks elsewhere. "My guidance is clear," he declared. "As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region." While Obama never quite said that his approach was intended to constrain the rise of China, few observers doubt that a policy of "containment" has returned to the Pacific. Indeed, the U.S. military has taken the first steps in this direction, announcing, for example, that by 2017 all three U.S. stealth planes, the F-22, F-35, and B-2, would be deployed to bases relatively near China and that by 2020 60% of U.S. naval forces will be stationed in the Pacific (compared to 50% today). However, the nation's budget woes have led many analysts to question whether the Pentagon is actually capable of fully implementing the military part of any Asian pivot strategy in a meaningful way. A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at the behest of Congress, released last summer, concluded that the Department of Defense "has not adequately articulated the strategy behind its force posture planning [in the Asia-Pacific] nor aligned the strategy with resources in a way that reflects current budget realities." This, in turn, has fueled a drive by military hawks to press the administration to spend more on Pacific-oriented forces and to play a more vigorous role in countering China's "bullying" behavior in the East and South China Seas. "[America's Asian allies] are waiting to see whether America will live up to its uncomfortable but necessary role as the true guarantor of stability in East Asia, or whether the region will again be dominated by belligerence and intimidation," former Secretary of the Navy and former Senator James Webb wrote in the Wall Street Journal. Although the administration has responded to such taunts by reaffirming its pledge to bolster its forces in the Pacific, this has failed to halt the calls for an even tougher posture by Washington. Obama has already been chided for failing to provide sufficient backing to Israel in its struggle with Iran over nuclear weapons, and it is safe to assume that he will face even greater pressure to assist America's allies in Asia were they to be threatened by Chinese forces. Add these three developments together, and you have the makings of a powder keg -- potentially at least as explosive and dangerous to the global economy as any confrontation with Iran. Right now, given the rising tensions, the first close encounter of the worst kind, in which, say, shots were unexpectedly fired and lives lost, or a ship or plane went down, might be the equivalent of lighting a fuse in a crowded, over-armed room. Such an incident could occur almost any time. The Japanese press has reported that government officials there are ready to authorize fighter pilots to fire warning shots if Chinese aircraft penetrate the airspace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. A Chinese general has said that such an act would count as the start of "actual combat." That the irrationality of such an event will be apparent to anyone who considers the deeply tangled economic relations among all these powers may prove no impediment to the situation -- as at the beginning of World War I -- simply spinning out of everyone's control. Can such a crisis be averted? Yes, if the leaders of China, Japan, and the United States, the key countries involved, take steps to defuse the belligerent and ultra-nationalistic pronouncements now holding sway and begin talking with one another about practical steps to resolve the disputes. Similarly, an emotional and unexpected gesture -- Prime Minister Abe, for instance, pulling a Nixon and paying a surprise goodwill visit to China -- might carry the day and change the atmosphere. Should these minor disputes in the Pacific get out of hand, however, not just those directly involved but the whole planet will look with sadness and horror on the failure of everyone involved.

**The plan creates the necessary framework to stop drone prolif**

Bloomberg, 2/5

(Bloomberg, “Building a Better Drone War”2/5/13

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-06/drone-war-needs-clear-rules-instead-of-more-leaks.html>, 8/15/13, EGM)

In fact, the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command should take control of the entire drone offensive**.** **Limiting the CIA’s role to intelligence sharing and putting the program under Title 10** of the U.S. Code, which **lays out the role of the military, would increase congressional oversight and transparency while still allowing necessary secrecy.** And **it would get the U.S. out of the ridiculous situation in which the only way for the administration to be honest with the public is to leak information about supposedly covert operations.**¶Then there is the question of how targets are chosen. Here again there are two basic types of strikes: those against people on the government’s “kill list,” and so-called signature strikes, which target unknown individuals because ground intelligence or aerial surveillance shows they are aiding an imminent terrorist threat. On the former, while many details of the kill list were already known, the leaked document shows how vague the criteria are for placing a U.S. citizen on it: that “an informed, high-level official” determines the American is a “continuing” threat. The Senate should push Brennan to be more specific.¶ Signature strikes present a more complicated issue. The reality of war is that one rarely knows the name, rank and serial number of the person on the receiving end of the bullet. In this war, the enemy frequently has no rank or serial number and an infinite supply of pseudonyms. If critics of such strikes want to limit the number of mistaken attacks and civilian casualties, a far better idea is to find alternatives to drones. The leaked document holds that drone strikes are carried out when assaults by ground forces are “infeasible,” but that term is so malleable as to be meaningless. And if the goal is always to kill, that makes a drone strike all the more likely. Why risk boots on the ground? The equation changes, however, if the goal is to capture and interrogate terrorists. At the moment, the government has no place to put them. Obama has sworn not to bring any more detainees into Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Congress forbids the detainees from being brought into U.S. territory; and the administration has largely stopped sending suspects to third- party countries for interrogation. Here is a question for the president, who swore on his first day in office to close the Cuban prison but has expended little political capital fighting Congress to get the job done: If suspected terrorists can’t be brought into the domestic U.S., why is reopening Guantanamo to new detainees worse than killing them?¶ **The Brennan hearings and document leak should also bring a new focus to some** underdiscussed **aspects of the drone war**. One is **whether it increases the risk of retaliatory attacks against U.S. interests, and whether such strikes hurt U.S. soft-power and diplomatic efforts in the Muslim world.**¶ To some extent these concerns are overblown; terrorists aren’t lacking for reasons to hurt the U.S., and public response to the drone war in those countries is hardly uniform. But **by bringing the programs out from the CIA’s shadow, the U.S. could make the case for them more openly to the governments involved and to their citizens** -- in the vernacular Urdu or Arabic.¶ **The U.S. must also reckon with the inevitability of rival powers and nonstate actors developing their own drones. Given its global head start and leverage on the issue, the U.S. has an interest in leading an effort to codify the use of drones in the laws of war**, as it did with nuclear weapons in the Cold War. **Otherwise, reflexively anti-American international bodies** such as the United Nations Human Rights Council, which last week announced a nine-month investigation into the drone campaign, **will step into the vacuum.**¶ Yes, the terrorists would ignore any global regime, and rogue states would try to buck the rules. Nevertheless, **a framework for the use of drones would be better than a flying- robot free-for-all and would allow the U.S. to stake out the high moral ground.**

# Plan

**The United States federal government should** change supervision of the drone program **from Title 50 of the United States Code to Title 10 of the United States Code.**

# Solvency

**Plan makes strikes more accountable and prevents abuses**

**Zenko, 13**

(Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He currently serves as vice chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Terrorism. Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning. “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon.” Date made April 16, 2013. Date retrieved August 14, 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434>)

U.S. targeted killings are needlessly made complex and opaque by their division between two separate entities: JSOC and the CIA. Although drone strikes carried out by the two organizations presumably target the same people, the organizations have different authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight. Splitting the drone program between the JSOC and CIA is apparently intended to allow the plausible deniability of CIA strikes. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 covert actions, defined as "activities of the United States Government . . . where it is intended that the role . . . will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional . . . military activities." As covert operations, the government cannot legally provide any information about how the CIA conducts targeted killings, while JSOC operations are guided by Title 10 "armed forces" operations and a publicly available military doctrine. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, details steps in the joint targeting cycle, including the processes, responsibilities, and collateral damage estimations intended to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. Unlike strikes carried out by the CIA, JSOC operations can be (and are) acknowledged by the U.S. government. The different reporting requirements of JSOC and the CIA mean that congressional oversight of U.S. targeted killings is similarly murky. Sometimes oversight is duplicated among the committees; at other times, there is confusion over who is mandated to oversee which operations. CIA drone strikes are reported to the intelligence committees. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), has confirmed that the SSCI receives poststrike notifications, reviews video footage, and holds monthly meetings to "question every aspect of the program." Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), has said that he reviews both CIA and JSOC counterterrorism airstrikes. JSOC does not report to the HPSCI. As of March 2012, all JSOC counterterrorism operations are reported quarterly to the armed services committees. Meanwhile, the foreign relations committees—tasked with overseeing all U.S. foreign policy and counterterrorism strategies—have formally requested briefings on drone strikes that have been repeatedly denied by the White House. However, oversight should not be limited to ensuring compliance with the law and preventing abuses, but rather expanded to ensure that policies are consistent with strategic objectives and aligned with other ongoing military and diplomatic activities. This can only be accomplished by DOD operations because the foreign relations committees cannot hold hearings on covert CIA drone strikes.

**Shift to DOD solves**

Zenko, 13

(Micah Zenko, the Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He currently serves as vice chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Terrorism. Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Care, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, 6/15/13, EGM)

**The president should direct that U.S. drone strikes be conducted as DOD Title 10 operations. That decision would enhance U.S. national security** in the following ways: **Improve the transparency and legitimacy of targeted killings,** including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm**. Focus the finite resources of the CIA on its original core missions** of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. (There is no reason for the CIA to maintain a redundant fleet of armed drones, or to conduct military operations that are inherently better suited to JSOC, the premier specialized military organization. As "traditional military activities" under U.S. law, these belong under Title 10 operations.) **Place all drone strikes under a single international legal framework, which would be clearly delineated for military operations and can therefore be articulated publicly. Unify congressional oversight** of specific operations under the armed services committee, which would end the current situation whereby there is confusion over who has oversight responsibility. **Allow U.S. government officials to counter myths and misinformation about targeted killings at home and abroad** **by acknowledging responsibility for its own strikes. Increase pressure on other states to be more transparent in their own conduct** of military and paramilitary operations in nonbattlefield settings **by establishing the precedent that the Obama administration claims can have a normative influence on how others use drones**

**The plan adds an extra layer of accountability**

Klaidman, 3/19

(Daniel Klaidman, national political correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast, “Exclusive: No More Drones for CIA,” 3/19/13, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/19/exclusive-no-more-drones-for-cia.html>, 8/15/13, EGM)

How does the CIA’s targeted killing program differ from the military’s—and what are the implications of shifting one program into the other? Perhaps most important is that **the CIA’s program is “covert**”—which is to say it is not only highly classified, **it’s deniable under the law**. That means the CIA, in theory, can lie about the existence of the program or about particular operations. **The military’s targeted killing program,** however, is “clandestine”—which means it **is secret but not deniable**. There are other important differences between how the two programs are run, especially the process by which killing decisions are made. **Since the inception of the drone program, targeting decisions have been made inside the CIA with little or no input from other agencies**, though the White House sometimes weighs in. In deciding who should be placed on its kill list, **the military, on the other hand, subjects itself to robust interagency vetting, where officials and lawyers from across the national security bureaucracy weigh in** on individual targeting “nominations.” **While the CIA’s process is said to be extremely rigorous**—in some ways even more rigorous than the military’s—**the opportunity for**, say, **the State Department legal adviser to be heard on lethal activities adds an extra layer of accountability.** With the CIA’s program moving to the Pentagon, the DOD’s vetting procedures will prevail.

**Title 10 creates new limitations which make drones more legitimate**

Kaplan, 3/21

(Fred Kaplan, The Slate, “The Drones Are in the Details,” 3/21/13,

<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/03/john_brennan_wants_the_pentagon_to_take_command_of_the_cia_s_drone_strike.html>, 8/15/13, EGM)

To put it in legal terms, drone strikes in Afghanistan fall under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which sets rules for the armed forces, while drone strikes in countries outside of official war zones fall under Title 50, which provides authority for covert operations. It defines covert actions as activities “to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad” without the appearance or acknowledgment of a U.S. government role—adding that these actions do “not include traditional military activities.”\*¶ **Shifting control of drone strikes from the CIA to the military essentially means shifting authority for those drone strikes from Title 50 to Title 10. It places them under the rubric of “traditional military activities”—and the standards and practices of U.S. armed forces**. One implication of this is that **it will be harder to justify drone strikes in areas where U.S. troops are not openly at war. It also means that if a president contemplates stretching the limits** of Title 10—that is, if he or she considers drone strikes outside war zones—**the military’s lawyers will get involved, and they tend to be more scrupulous than CIA lawyers** (who, after all, deal with overseas covert actions, which often skirt, or ignore, U.S. law). **One pertinent provision of Title 10 is that, in order for U.S. armed forces to operate on foreign soil, they must get permission of the local government.** **If the military controlled drone strikes, they couldn’t be ordered without this permission**. However, there are two ways around these strictures. First, there have been occasions when presidents—including President Obama—have simply (and legally) declared that certain members of the armed forces are, for the moment, acting under Title 50. Most notably, when Navy SEALs raided Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, they were declared to be under CIA command. Therefore, they did not need the Pakistanis’ permission to cross the border. The same abracadabra could be recited for drone operators.¶ Or maybe the president wouldn’t even have to go that far. SEALs, like Delta Force and other “shadow” forces, are part of the Joint Special Operations Command. JSOC is part of the armed forces; it therefore falls under Title 10. However, under an executive order signed by President George W. Bush (and still in effect), it has authority to conduct secret operations against al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist networks worldwide.¶

#### **Getting the CIA out is a pre-req to any effective drone policy**

Weber, 2/6

(Peter Weber, The Week, “Will Congress curb Obama's drone strikes?” 2/6/13

<http://theweek.com/article/index/239716/will-congress-curb-obamas-drone-strikes>, 8/18/13, EGM)

**Since** at least the **9/11** attacks, **Congress has been less** than **confrontational with the White House over presidential powers to conduct war and anti-terrorism operations**, to the dismay of civil libertarians. So we had President George W. Bush's warrantless domestic wiretaps retroactively green-lighted by Congress, torture only officially nixed by a change in presidents, and a big ramping-up of lethal drones being used to kill terrorism suspects under President Obama. But Obama's decision to kill at least two Americans working for al Qaeda in Yemen in 2011, and the legal justification that emerged in a leaked white paper (read below) this week, has caused a big, unusual outcry from both the Left and Right. When was the last time lefties Glenn Greenwald, Salon's Joan Walsh, and MSNBC host Ed Shultz were on the same page as conservatives Patrick (Patterico) Frey, Joe Scarborough, and Judge Andrew Napolitano of Fox News? ¶ Some **members of Congress** "uncomfortable with the Obama administration's use of deadly drones," mostly but not all Democrats, **are "looking to limit America's authority to kill suspected terrorist**s, even U.S. citizens," says Lara Jakes of The Associated Press. **The Obama team's justification for carrying out drone strikes relies heavily on a law Congress passed three days after the 9/11 attacks that authorizes the military** to use "all necessary and appropriate force" — including drone attacks — against al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.¶ "It has to be in the agenda of this Congress to reconsider the scope of action of drones and use of deadly force by the United States around the world because the original authorization of use of force, I think, is being strained to its limits," Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) tells the AP. "We are sort of running on the steam that we acquired right after our country was attacked in the most horrific act of terror in U.S. history," agrees Rep. Keith Ellison (D-Minn.). "**We have learned much since 9/11, and now it's time to take a more sober look at where we should be with use of force."** One problem for lawmakers, says The New York Times in an editorial, is that when it comes to drone strikes, **the Obama team "utterly rejects the idea that Congress or the courts have any right to review such a decision in advance**, or even after the fact." Along with citing the law authorizing broad use of force against al Qaeda, **the white paper** also "**argues that judges and Congress don't have the right to rule on or interfere with decisions made in the heat of combat."** And most troublingly, Obama won't give Congress the classified document detailing the legal justification used to kill American al Qaeda operative Anwar al-Awlaki. It's interesting to watch conservatives show (or at least feign) outrage over a policy that "would have been met with right-wing hosannas under Bush/Cheney," says Steve M. at No More Mister Nice Blog. But even with the grumbling from the Left and Right, "I don't think any of this is going to stop the drone strikes." ¶ I can't really see righties and lefties banding together to do something upliftingly democratic and bipartisan like forcing a reconsideration of the policy via combined public pressure (when was the last time something like that happened in America?) — there are too many people in office, from both parties, who like what's being done by the administration. [No More Mister Nice Blog]¶ Going forward, he should submit decisions like this one to review by Congress and the courts. If necessary, Congress could create a special court to handle this sort of sensitive discussion, like the one it created to review wiretapping. This dispute goes to the fundamental nature of our democracy, to the relationship among the branches of government and to their responsibility to the public. [New York Times] "Outrage is being dutifully ginned up" not just by politicians and pundits — straight reporting on the white paper "clearly assumes that we are supposed to be outraged," too, says Eric Posner at Slate. "But the memo is utterly conventional as legal analysis," and the only thing you need to understand about it, really, is that "Obama administration lawyers have enthusiastically endorsed the once-vilified Bush administration decision to classify security operations against al Qaeda as 'war' rather than as 'law enforcement.'" Congress allowed that by authorizing "war" not just with Afghanistan but with al Qaeda and its affiliates in 2001, and if we are at war with the terrorists, they can be killed on sight. "And it doesn't matter if you're an al Qaeda member who happens to be a U.S. citizen, just as it didn't matter if you were a German soldier who happened to be an American citizen during World War II."¶ **Obama and Bush administration lawyers have stretched the Constitution and traditional rules of international law to accommodate the threat posed by terrorism**. **Some people will say they violated the law. But given the political consensus supporting these moves within the U.S., it is more accurate to say that the law has evolved. It gives the president the discretion he needs, or at least wants, to address an amorphous threat. Let's hope he uses that discretion wisely**. [Slate] "The U.S. is, in effect, waging two different drone wars," one run by the Pentagon, mainly in places like Yemen and Somalia, and the other carried out by the CIA in Afghanistan and, more often, Pakistan, says Bloomberg View in an editorial. The military's drone program is "operated by military professionals, trained in and bound by international and U.S. military law," and thus "much more appropriate." **There are lots of things Congress and the Obama team can and should change** — making the goal to capture, not kill, terrorists, say, and codifying the rules for drone warfare internationally — **but getting the CIA out of the drone game is a key first step.**¶ **Limiting the CIA's role to intelligence sharing and putting the program under Title 10 of the U.S. Code,** which lays out the role of the military, **would increase congressional oversight and transparency while still allowing necessary secrecy. And it would get the U.S. out of the ridiculous situation in which the only way for the administration to be honest with the public is to leak information about supposedly covert operations.** [Bloomberg]

**No disads—Obama just decimated war powers**

**Nather and Palmer, 9/1**

(David Nather, masters degree in Poly Sci from George Washington University and senior policy reporter at POLITICO Pro, Anna Palmer, senior Washington correspondent for POLITICO, "Bushies fear Obama weakening presidency", 9/1/13, [www.politico.com/story/2013/09/bushies-fear-obama-weakening-presidency-96143.html?hp=t1\_3](http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/bushies-fear-obama-weakening-presidency-96143.html?hp=t1_3) NL)

**President Barack Obama just turned decades of debate over presidential war powers on its head**.¶ **Until Saturday, when Obama went to Congress to ask for permission to strike Syria, the power to launch military action had been strongly in the hands of the commander in chief**. Even the 1973[War Powers Resolution](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warpower.asp) allows bombs to start falling before the president has to ask Congress for long-term approval.¶ **For three decades after Watergate, conservatives like Dick Cheney and those of his ilk sought to increase executive branch power that they felt had been eroded by liberal congressional reformers.** George W. Bush’s legal team crafted controversial opinions that emboldened the White House on a wide range of national security areas, from interrogation to surveillance.¶ **That makes the move by Obama to hand a piece of the messy situation in Syria to Congress a clear step in the other direction — an abdication of power to Congress** at a moment when he has no good solutions.¶ And **even if Obama ultimately balks at Congress if they vote down his ask, prominent conservatives who fueled the expansion of presidential power** — especially Bush administration alums — **are beside themselves, arguing that Obama has weakened the presidency**.¶ John Yoo, who wrote the legal opinions that justified the Bush administration’s interrogation tactics with sweeping views of executive power, says Obama has undermined the quick-strike ability that gives presidents much of their power in dealing with military threats.

#### Switching solves

Reuters, 13

(Tabassum Zakaria, Reuters, “As drone monopoly frays, Obama seeks global rules,” 3/17/13, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/17/us-usa-security-drones-idUSBRE92G02720130317>, 6/3/13, EGM)

INTERNAL DEBATES One focus of U.S. officials' internal debate is whether to shift drone operations to the Pentagon from the CIA. That would allow the CIA to return to more traditional operations of espionage and intelligence analysis, and put the killing of terrorism targets in the hands of the military. It would probably be a "phased approach" that would account for differences in the threat and political sensitivities, said a second U.S. official. "There would have to be some tailoring." In Pakistan, where the U.S. military is not in ground combat, the Obama administration would probably not want drone strikes to appear as being conducted by the military. In Yemen, there may not be the same sensitivities. U.S. military personnel are on the ground working with Yemenis in counterterrorism operations. The United States has also carried out drone strikes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Somalia. "I think if they moved it, not as a covert action program, but one of the tools of the warfighter, then the result of it is probably going to be more public exposure about what they are doing," Stephen Hadley, national security adviser under Bush, said. The "center of gravity" in internal administration debates is the goal of greater consistency on how drone strikes are managed, decided upon, and executed, the second official said.

#### US Key

Zenko, 13

(Micah Zenko, the Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He currently serves as vice chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Terrorism. Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Care, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, 6/15/13, EGM)

The current trajectory of U.S. drone strike policies is unsustainable. Without reform from within, drones risk becoming an unregulated, unaccountable vehicle for states to deploy lethal force with impunity. Consequently, the United States should more fully explain and reform aspects of its policies on drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings by ending the controversial practice of “signature strikes”; limiting targeted killings to leaders of transnational terrorist organizations and individuals with direct involvement in past or ongoing plots against the United States and its allies; and clarifying rules of the road for drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Given that the United States is currently the only country—other than the United Kingdom in the traditional battlefield of Afghanistan and perhaps Israel—to use drones to attack the sovereign territory of another country, it has a unique opportunity and responsibility to engage relevant international actors and shape development of a normative framework for acceptable use of drones.